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Commentary/Donald: Origins of mind
at a certain level links between biology and behavior undoubt-
edly exist, when one considers specific links, caution is neces-
sary.
The behavioral implications of later Lower Paleolithic archae-
ology (the period Donald uses as his model of the behavior of
Homo erectus) are also less clear than was generally believed
until only recently. In particular, the characterization of Lower
Paleolithic peoples as regular hunters of very large game, such
as elephants, has come under attack (Binford 1987; Klein 1987,
pp. 11-32), although in my opinion even elephants were proba-
bly hunted, at least on occasion (Adam 1951; Scott 1980 - also
see Villa 1990). What is not clear is how much social complexity
this hunting required. I doubt that the need for communication
in hunting would have played a very big role in the evolution of
mimesis. In fact, the one thing that would be most useful in
cooperative hunting, the ability to discuss future and conditional
events with precision, would probably not be possible without
the syntactic structures provided by language.
Inferring sexual division of labor and cooperation on the basis
of (1) hunting or (2) the clustering of stone tools and animal bones
into the concentrations we call sites has also come under very
serious attack over the last two decades, although the primary
arena for this debate has been the basal Paleolithic sites of East
Africa (usually attributed to Homo habilis; see Isaac 1983 and
Klein 1989, pp. 170-80, for summaries). It is possible (but not
demonstrated) that division of labor was common by the later
Lower Paleolithic. By the Middle Paleolithic of Europe there is
little doubt that Neanderthals were at the very least transport-
ing meat from place to place on a regular basis (e.g., Chase 1986,
pp. 46-57) and it may be that this reflected sharing (1) between
hunting/foraging parties and those remaining at home, (2)
between different hunting/foraging parties, or (3) between
hunting parties and foraging parties.
Many scholars have drawn conclusions about intelligence or
symbolism from Middle Pleistocene stone tools. However, their
cognitive implications are not entirely clear. Donald may over-
estimate the difficulty of making stone tools. It is true that it
takes practice, but a few months of practice should be seen in
terms of a young hominid growing up doing what the surround-
ing grownups are doing. In fact, it is doubtful that pedagogy is
necessary for Lower Paleolithic stone tool technology. After all,
the making of Paleolithic-style stone tools was a lost art, recon-
structed by archaeologists working without even the benefit of
someone to observe. On the other hand, it is also true that the
skills involved are apparently beyond the ability of chimpanzees
to master. However, exactly what new cognitive abilities are
required has not been analyzed in the kind of detail the subject
deserves. The only in-depth study has been done by Wynn
(1979; 1981; 1985; 1989), using a Piagetian perspective, and for
the most part he considered secondary attributes of stone tools
such as the relative placement of different flake scars rather than
the fundamental problem of learning how to remove a flake from
a stone core. It is thus difficult to evaluate the need for a new
cognitive structure such as Donald's mimesis.
Another old archaeological belief coming under increasing
attack is the idea that the stone tools of the Lower or Middle
Paleolithic (or even, for that matter, many of the tools of the
Upper Paleolithic) required a great deal of time to manufacture
and were made for specific purposes well in advance of actual
need. Some lithics specialists (Dibble 1987; 1988; Rolland &
Dibble 1990, pp. 482-86, see also Chase 1990) feel that such
tools were often if not usually ad hoc in nature, and even more
elaborate tools such as bifaces were probably usually multipur-
pose tools not destined for a particular purpose.
Not all of these comments are critiques of Donald's book, and
certainly none go to the heart of what he has to say. The most
important point is that, in general, the meaning of archaeologi-
cal data in psychological terms is either unclear or controversial
or both. One reason is a lack of communication between archae-
ology and psychology. If more researchers follow Donald's
example in the future, there is every reason to hope that the
dialogue between archaeology and psychology will benefit both
disciplines.
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There is much to applaud in Merlin Donald's careful and
imaginative reworking of our collective cognitive history. The
head-on confrontation of so many major puzzles concerning how
any sequence of individually viable transitions might bridge the
abyss between ape and man is a delight, as is the author's
sensitive and balanced treatment of the powerful role of external
symbol systems in reconfiguring human cognition. My purpose
in this commentary is merely to draw attention to what I see as
the major cognitive scientific problem which Donald's discus-
sion isolates, and to make a suggestion concerning how best to
view it.
The key unsolved mystery, if we accept the bulk of Donald's
discussion, concerns what he calls "symbolic invention." The
problem of symbolic invention (which may or may not be
identical with what the author calls "the problem of reference,"
p. 368 - I found the latter usage puzzling) concerns how we
achieve the spontaneous and repeated development of new
symbols. It is this ability which both distinguishes our use of
symbolic media from that of the apes (p. 160) and which the
author depicts as the vital innovation of the so-called mimetic
mind ("mimesis is fundamentally different . . . in that it in-
volves the invention of intentional representations," p. 169).
Again and again in the book Donald comments on the important
difference between the spontaneous and repeated invention of
symbols and the mere ability to exploit them once they are
available (see, e.g., pp. 134, 160, 169, 368). Once symbolic
invention is achieved, the organism is on the royal road to the
third transition and genetic evolution can be replaced by cul-
tural evolution grounded in the exploitation of a burgeoning
series of external symbol systems and external memory systems.
Symbolic invention thus seems to be the real "missing link." But
what exactly is missing? How best to conceptualize this pivotal
issue?
One possibility (which I think of as pretty much Daniel
Dennett's view of the problem - see Dennett [1991] and
especially Dennett [forthcoming] is to try deflationary tactics.
[See also Dennett: "Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology"
BBS 6(3) 1983; "Pr6cis of The Intentional Stance" BBS 11(3)
1988; and Dennett & Kinsbourne "Time and the Observer" BBS
15(2) 1992. ] One key deflationary tactic is to reverse Donald's
order of events. Instead of depicting some complex of biological
adaptations as the root of a capacity for symbolic invention and
public language as an effect of symbolic invention, the presence
of public language is itself depicted as the root of symbolic
invention! This sounds paradoxical. But a story can be told. A
tortuous sequence of chance discoveries (e.g., of the usefulness
of using some external items as labels for others) eventually puts
a kind of protolanguage in place. Exposure to this new kind of
input reconfigures the next generation's cognitive architecture
in a way which promotes the development by them of a little
more language. And so on, until we reach the present state of
affairs in which the average child is exposed to the fantastically
potent reconfiguring forces of the whole external symbolic
apparatus of the "theoretic mind." Children's rich abilities of
symbolic invention are, in this scenario, then explained by their
experience with the symbols of public language. Public lan-
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guage is seen as the software which reconfigures the mind so as
to make symbolic invention possible.
The deflationary response is, I think, interesting and deserves
some careful consideration. My own view is that Donald is right
to opt for the other scenario, in which there is a computational
"missing link" which puts a capacity for symbolic invention in
place and thus primes the onset of public language. I close,
however, with the suggestion that it may be fruitful to broaden
the notion of symbolic invention, for, as Donald uses it, sym-
bolic invention implies the spontaneous and repeated creation
of new external symbols. But a prior question concerns the
ability of a system already capable of episodic thought to recode
those thoughts in a series of increasingly abstract ways which
support more flexible (but still nonlinguistic) behaviors. This
notion of progressive recoding is the heart of Karmiloff-Smith's
(1979; 1992) theory of representational redescription. Its com-
putational implications are further discussed in Clark and
Karmiloff-Smith (forthcoming) and Clark (forthcoming).
The simple suggestion I want to make here is that instead of
focussing directly on external symbolic invention as the central
issue, we may see the creation of new external symbols as
continuous with the progressive creation of new internal sym-
bols and structures. Thus refocussed, what emerges as crucial is
the ability to engage in forms of computation that construct
higher and higher orders of representational content. And one
fascinating feature of the recent connectionist work which Don-
ald later mentions is that such systems are able spontaneously to
construct new (higher order) internal representations, although
they do so only in quite limited ways (see e.g., Rumelhart et al.
1986). Understanding the nature of these abilities and finding
ways to overcome these limitations may provide a practical
means of one day illuminating the much more opaque issue of
how we invent and use new external symbols. The key issue thus
construed is representational invention: symbolic invention is
best seen as a special case.
A natural history of the mind: A guide for
cognitive science
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Cognitive science seeks to understand how the mind emerges
from the brain. Artificial intelligence seeks to implant a mind
within the machine. To their detriment, both have largely
ignored work on the natural history of the mind. They would do
well to pay close attention to Merlin Donald's account of mental
evolution.
The archeology of mental evolution is of course a difficult
project since the mind leaves no fossils. Only the artifacts
produced by brains containing minds controlling bodies are
available for examination. Not until the advent of writing do we
apparently have direct access to the thoughts of others. Looking
back to the dawn of history, Snell (I960), comparing the language
of Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, concludes that mentality changed
between the periods represented in the two works. In the Iliad,
there is no word for the modern concept of mind. The stormers
of Troy seem to be sleep walkers controlled by godly visions. But
after the fall of Troy, clever Odysseus appears a modern man,
fully self-aware and introspective.
The more controversial Jaynes (1977) also finds a phase
change when comparing earlier written records with more
modern. His evidence is Biblical; the book of Amos sounds alien
to a modem ear, whereas the more modern book of Job is fully
modern (it is even the basis for contemporary song). Jaynes seeks
reasons for the change within the structures of the brain, but his
explanations involving the formation of laterality in the brain do
not ring true.
Although ancient literature hints at a different style of think-
ing, ancient artifacts do not. Allowing for a more primitive
technology, the equipment of the Neolithic hunter recently
found frozen in the Alps does not seem strange to a modern
backpacker. Donalds Origins of the Modern Mind provides a
natural explanation for these observations.
Briefly, Donald divides the evolution of mind into four stages.
First at about 2 million years B.P. , ape becomes hominid. The
hominid mental culture is an extension of the episodic culture
characteristic of apes. The penultimate ape, the hominids are
able to respond to very complex sets of stimulus scripts or
episodes, but they do not plan ahead.
Around 700,000 years B. P. , Homo erectus appears. The Homo
erectus mental culture is mimetic; they think and plan ahead,
but do so without language. As a modern example, Donald cites
the case history of Brother John. When epileptic attacks deprive
Br. John of language, he is nevertheless able to plan and carry
out quite complex scenarios. H. erectus brings the ability to
manipulate the environment through tool use to modern levels.
Properly educated, a H. erectus could make a living through
manual labor in the modern world.
Around 60,000 years B.P. modern man, Homo sapiens, ap-
pears. H. sapiens has spoken language and has a mental mythic
or linguistic culture. Communication is oral and societal struc-
ture is maintained through ritual. Perhaps the peak of mythic
culture was reached with the world-wide rule of Roman oratory.
Nevertheless, the fully modern mind does not appear until after
the advent of writing. Early systems of writing, cuneiform and
so on, however, access the linguistic part of the brain only
indirectly, through the earlier episodic and mimetic portions. As
a result, these systems implemented linguistic storage and
communication imperfectly, and were not widespread among
H. sapiens culture.
The breakthrough into theoretic culture comes with the
invention of the phonetic alphabet. The direct mapping of
visual, physical symbols to phonemes enables the linguistic
portion of the brain to begin directly processing writing. Pho-
netic writing provides an organizing center, linking external
memory storage to all three portions of the brain - episodic,
mimetic, and linguistic. The brain plus external storage is thus
more capable than what came before; the modern mind has
been born. A feel for the brain/phonetic writing synergism can
be gotten from Donald's metaphor for reading. In reading, the
contents of the book take control of the brain of the reader. The
book is the source material and the brain is merely the player.
The brain/written word is thus something more than the brain
alone.
Thus, our modern manual skills date back to the era of H.
erectus, and similarly, our rituals and icons originate in the
Paleolithic. Only in historic time, however, does the synergistic
combination of brain and environment occur that is the modern
mind. As Snell and Jaynes argue, traces of this change can be
found in written literature.
Donalds mental architecture is quite different from the
computational paradigm much used in cognitive science. His
architecture makes explicit allowance for the external environ-
ment through the central organizing principle of phonetic writ-
ten language. The architecture is also vastly different from the
low-level approaches advocated by connectionists. Although
Donald does discuss neurophysiological features such as Broca's
area, this is mostly to argue that natural selection has worked on
the brain. Donald's work suggests new approaches based on the
natural history of the mind. It deserves close attention by both
cognitive scientists and AI researchers.
On a final speculative note, echoed by Donald himself in his
final sentences, the ideas in Origins of the Modern Mind should
be applied to the present. The current developments in interac-
tive, networked, multi-media, and virtual means of cornmunica-
754 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1993) 16:4
